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ABSTRACT 
 
Land reform is concerned with changing the institutional structure governing man’s relationship 
with the land, involving intervention in the prevailing pattern of land ownership, control and usage 
in order to change the structure of holdings, improve land productivity and broaden the distribution 
of benefits. Land reform is an aggregate of ideas and courses of action designed to resolve tenure 
problems. Nigeria is, an agrarian nation with over 56.8% of her working force engaged in farming. 
Doner and Kanel emphasize the significant contribution of the agricultural sector towards the 
overall economic development of underdeveloped countries, such as Nigeria where more than. 50% 
of the working population is engaged in farming. Agricultural reforms has the advantage of 
provision of more employment, more equitable income distribution, a wider relevant structure for 
the growing manufacturing sector, a better base for farm financed welfare, and more rational 
investment policies in both the agricultural and nonagricultural sectors of the economy. Traditional 
land tenure system defined the opportunity to earn income in farming and provided the security that 
an individual would always have access to some part of his family’s land. However, investment in 
land improvement and increases in productivity are hindered by tenure rules. The unknown nature 
of the ultimate results of tenure changes increases the risks involved in initiating any program of 
land reform. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n the words of the World Bank, land reform is “concerned with changing the institutional structure 
governing man’s relationship with the land, involving intervention in the prevailing pattern of land 
ownership, control and usage in order to change the structure of holdings, improve land productivity and 
broaden the distribution of benefits” (World Bank, 1996). Parsons (1996) defines land reform as the aggregate of ideas 
and courses of action designed to resolve tenure problems. His viewpoint is generally in line with the one expressed 
by the World Bank. 
 
Nigeria is one of the few newly industrialized Third World nations whose growth rate in the last two decades 
has been estimated to 12.8 between 1990-98 and 17.65 (1999-98) (A. de Janvry and  Sadoulet, 1996). Nigeria is, 
however, an agrarian nation with over 56.8% of her working force engaged in farming (Afolayan, 1998). The 
importance of this sector in the overall economic development of Nigeria can, therefore, not be overemphasized. 
Doner and Kanel (1997) emphasized the significant contribution of the agricultural sector towards the overall 
economic development of underdeveloped countries where more than 50% of the working population is engaged in 
farming. 
 
With current emphasis being laid mainly on the development of the industrial sector at the expense of 
agriculture, the economic development Nigeria is currently embarked upon is an inequitable one in view of its social 
disarticulation. To correct this, the agricultural sector has to be developed. This can only take place, however, through 
an agrarian reform which can be achieved through a workable land reform strategy. This paper, therefore, focuses on 
some economic implications of two possible land reform techniques: land consolidation against small holdings. 
I 
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Nigeria is a highly heterogeneous society in terms of the social and cultural relations of its people to land, and much 
detailed research would be needed in order to arrive at possible land reform strategies for the different parts of the 
country. This means that one set of land reform policy may not be ideal for Nigeria. 
 
Main objectives: 
 
1. Brief outline of the present land tenure system in two geographical divisions of Nigeria, and the rationale for 
land reform. 
2. Identification and description of the two types of land reform strategies. 
3. Economic implications of the different strategies. 
4. Landowner’s decisions to allocate land to forest and agriculture 
 
PRESENT LAND TENURE/ LAND USE IN THE DIFFERENT PARTS OF NIGERIA AND RATIONALE 
FOR LAND REFORM 
 
Nigeria could be divided into two broad geographical units- north and south- with respect to both the land 
tenure and land use patterns. With respect to this, works of Straus (1994), Famoriyo (1996), Hill (1986), Timmons 
(1994), Chubb (1995), and Oyenuga (1997), just to mention a few, have described to some extend the various land 
tenure and land use systems in Nigeria. The overall religious, cultural and social impact of the land tenure system is 
reflected in Table 1, which shows the apparent difference between farm sizes in the different parts of the country- the 
holdings of the northern part of the country being definitely larger than those of the south. This trend perhaps explains 
the greater proportion of unemployment among the northerners since, as a result of the past trends, a greater 
proportion of the working population has been turned into landless peasants due to the land tenure system (Baldwin 
1996). 
 
Table 2 shows number of farms by tenure pattern expressed as percentage of total number of farms covered 
by states. The significant difference in the proportion of total number of farms under family ownership are now 
fragmented, a greater amount of farms under family ownership still exist as large chunks since, by virtue of the 
customary law, the right to the land belongs to the family, as a whole. We can, therefore, identify two major sizes of 
farmlands, which must be taken into cognizance in the land reform strategy to be adopted. 
 
RATIONALE FOR LAND REFORM IN NIGERIA 
 
Much of the arguments against fragmentation which includes reduction of farm sizes, loss of land through fencing, 
waste of time in commuting, inadequate attention to distant fields and mechanization difficulties which all lead to low 
or decreased agricultural productivity have been discussed by several authors (e.g., Chisholm, op cit .; Floyd, op cit., 
Igbozurike 1997). Compounding the problem in Nigeria, however, is the fact that: 
 
1. Nigeria has a large and mainly agricultural population that is rapidly increasing at about 5.8% (Afolayan 
1998). 
2. Nigeria has been experiencing a continuing decrease in both the aggregate size of farmed space and the 
proportion of persons able and willing to engage in agriculture. 
3. Nigeria has recorded little success in diverse agrarian development schemes, including provision of 
agricultural loans/ credit to farmers, institution of large-scale farm settlement projects, establishment of 
agricultural development corporations and provision for technical assistance to farmers. 
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Table 1 
 Acres Farmed By Size In Nigeria Percentage Of All Farmers 
Size of Farms 
(Acres) 
North 
eastern 
States 
South 
western 
States 
Middle 
Belt 
States 
Eastern 
States 
North 
western 
States 
Niger- 
Delta 
States 
South 
eastern 
States 
North 
central 
States 
Under 0.25 1.1 8.6 16.9 16.9 1.2 10.6 7.1 1.3 
Under 0.50 2.3 13.7 17.4 22.3 3.7 16.4 14 2.4 
Under 1.00 8.4 22.7 22.7 22.6 8 20.9 22.4 7.6 
Under 2.50 26 28.5 31.8 21.6 25.1 34 38 29.6 
Under 5.00 30.5 18.9 10.4 7.4 29.9 12. 16.3 31 
Under 10.00 22.8 6.1 0.8 1.5 22.7 4.7 1.9 20.8 
Over 8.9 1.4 - 0.5 9.4 9.5 0.2 7.3 
Source: Federal Office of Statistics, Economic Indicators, Vol. 6, No.8 August 1970.n.a ≡ not available 
 
 
Table 2 
Number Of Farms By Tenure Pattern Expressed As Percentage Of Total Number Of Farms By States, 1999-2001 
Selected States Village 
Head 
Family 
Head 
Inheritanc
e 
Purchase Loan Rent Gift Other 
Kaduna 3.30 -60.91 -6.10 12.96 2.28 4.56 1.78 8.38 
Gongola,,Bauchi, 
Borno 
7.48 58.27 7.48 5.12 - - 1.18 20.47 
Niger & Sokoto 8.33 65.44 - 13.24 2.45 2.20 2.70 5.64 
Benue & Plateau 0.27 64.66 8.77 77.67 3.56 9.50 5.21 0.27 
Kano 2.22 59.83 12.47 - - 3.60 0.55 8.86 
Kwara 11.33 48.67 12.00 0.67 9.33 - 3.33 14.67 
Oyo, Ondo, & 
Ogun 
7.67 49.14 17.93 1.84 5.72 1.60 4.00 12.10 
Imo & Anambra 5.38 42.30 35.98 6.70 - 6.05 - 3.59 
Cross River 0.59 61.31 2.23 16.74 - 18.15 0.30 0.70 
Rivers 20.60 54.15 1.33 8.31 - 13.95 0.33 1.33 
Bendel 0.50 52.06 33.79 6.09 - 4.32 0.49 2.75 
Lagos - 39.01 23.77 - - 31.84 2.24 3.14 
Nigeria 5.26 53.63 16.24 7.75 1.70 6.95 1.68 6.77 
Note: Nil 
Source: Rural Economic Survey of Nigeria, Federal Office of Statistics, Lagos Nigeria. 1999. 
 
 
POSSIBLE LAND REFORM STRATEGIES 
 
Two major schools of thought seem to have emerged on the issue of land reform under a setting such as Nigeria’s: 
  
1. advocates of land consolidation; 
2. advocates of small farm holdings. 
 
Land Consolidation 
  
This is essentially a process in which scattered agricultural land holdings are amalgamated into operationally 
larger entities in order to eliminate some of the ills of land fragmentation (Igbozurike 1997). 
 
This could be achieved through four basic modes (Igbozurike 1997) compromising of three basic types and a 
fourth category combining some aspects of the basic types. Briefly, the three basic forms are: 
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Mode I 
 
Spontaneous or Voluntary Type: in which landholders, with or without the benefit of prior exposure to 
propaganda, or formal education on the subject decide to amalgamate and/ or exchange their plots. This, according to 
Chubb (1996), is usually a small-scale merger executed without much fanfare. Such exchanges are now, however, not 
very common among the Igbos as earlier on reported by Chubb (Igbozurike 1997). 
 
Mode II 
 
Exhortative or Persuasional Type: This involves a lot of formal campaigning mounted by the government or 
agency charged with that responsibility, and necessarily precedes acceptance and trial on the part of landholders. 
Though this has not been tried extensively in Nigeria, Oluwasanmi, et. al. (1996) emphasized that there is scarcely any 
basis for anticipating that alone and under its best guise, more than very restricted, local and sporadic success on 
consolidation can be attained, as was achieved in Uboma in Imo State (Anthanio and Ijere, 1997). 
 
Mode III 
 
Coercive or Compulsory Type: wherein legal, police, or military tactics are employed to affect land 
consolidation or according to Igbozurike (1997), where in the train of a major political crisis or socioeconomic 
upheaval, advantage is taken of unsettled social conditions to push through consolidation measure. 
 
The Egyptian land consolidation efforts (Saab 1997), is a fair illustration of benign official arm-twisting. So 
also is the Kenyan consolidation, which was coincidental with the Mau Mau rebellion (Sorrenson, 1997). In normal 
times, however, this mode of consolidation can be fuel for sociopolitical chaos (Penn 1961), as it involves public 
interest in private property. This approach was tried in Nigeria by the military government through the enactment of 
the land use decree of 1978. * In the Nigerian case, however, it was a complete failure in that the land use decree was 
enacted without full consideration of its goals, how it could be achieved, and the sociocultural constraints it was likely 
to encounter and how to combat it. 
 
Therefore, even though some writers hold the strong opinion that the military could execute land reform in 
view of their having handled highly sensitive issues like the creation of states, the adjustment of internal boundaries 
and such feats which are quite inconceivable in a civilian era (Igbozurike, 1997), the attempt at land reform failed. 
This perhaps indicates that the issue of land reform is not as easy as it is usually perceived. 
 
Development Of Small Holdings 
 
The process of individualization, in itself, has been described as an indicator of agricultural development 
based on the fact that land becomes valuable in terms of money (Jacoby, 1995). Proponents of this approach hold that 
a feasible means of achieving the joint objectives of agricultural production, growth and rural equity is through two 
different policies: 
 
1. Land reform, redistributing land from existing large farms into new small-scale   family farms. 
2. Channeling of improved inputs and credit to existing small-farm sectors in countries where land 
redistribution is not a feasible option in political terms (Berry and Cline, 1998). 
 
Measures aimed at redistribution of land consist of three distinct phases: expropriation distribution and 
organization of new farms. The actual measures of land redistribution will depend on whether the reform only aims at 
changing the status of tenant cultivators to owners without otherwise affecting the pattern of land distribution and 
utilization, or at breaking down centrally operated estates in order to introduce new groups of cultivators. 
 
Both policies are applicable in Nigeria where farm holdings range between 1-2 ha among the small farmers 
(Oyenuga, 1997) and well over 50 ha in family holdings for rich farmers. It has, therefore, been suggested that a 
possible approach to the present fall in productivity is to redistribute unutilized large family/ community holdings to 
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members of the family who are interested in agriculture, even if it would be on a lease basis and that new technology 
in the form of high yielding varieties of crops should be introduced on small farms to boost their productivity. 
 
These are the two major possible strategies towards land reform, which have been suggested for developing 
agrarian countries like Nigeria. Having described what each policy is all about, I shall now consider the economic 
implication of both approaches with the hope of identifying which would best suit the Nigerian aspiration of 
successful agricultural production, as well as improve rural employment and equitable income distribution. 
 
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS- LAND CONSOLIDATION VERSUS SMALL FARM UNITS 
 
According to Igbozurike (1997), fragmentation, which may be conceptually generalized as a circumstance in 
which one man owns or works two or more landholdings, has many casual and operational variations, which can be 
analyzed through the Relative Index of Land Parcellization, Pi. This is a quantitative measure of land fragmentation 
based on two parameters. To compute this index of spatial discontinuity, the following equation is resolved: 
 
   1001 tDsip   ………………………..……………………………………………………………………..….……(1) 
 
where Dt = aggregate distance between a man’s land parcels, s = hectarage of each parcel (=s the mean hectarage). 
Where the holding is not fragmented, Pi= 0. The distance between plots has been found to be as long as 12 kilometers 
in some cases, necessitating that farmers ride bicycles for the long distance. There is, however, a strong argument as to 
the waste of time spent commuting between the parcels and the possibility of inadequate attention being paid to 
distant fields. 
 
With the rapid industrial development, opportunities for non-farm employment increase. It is, therefore, 
believed that, if land is either redistributed or not consolidated, uneconomic size of farm units may result, especially in 
view of the apparent drift from the rural to urban areas. 
 
Labor productivity increases on larger farms due to the mechanization and labor-saving techniques which 
result in corresponding higher operator incomes, i.e., higher returns to the managerial and labor contributions of the 
farm operator and his family. This, therefore, makes larger  farms more profitable than small ones. 
 
Lewis (1996) emphasized that, in an economy such as Nigeria’s with a surplus supply of labor, there are 
large sectors of the economy where the marginal productivity of labor is negligible, zero, or even negative. This 
existence of “disguised” unemployment in the agricultural sector, in which the size of the family holding is so small 
that if some members of the family obtained employment somewhere else, the remaining members could cultivate the 
holding just as well, working a bit harder, is a glaring example. The ability of farmers with large extensions of land 
and the entrepreneurial talent to employ such labor force more gainfully is another argument in favor of land 
consolidation. 
 
Most of the agricultural equipment now being manufactured in the developed countries of the world, except 
in Japan, is designed to work on large farms. Aside from this, land purchase sometimes involves medium or long-term 
loans and, because large operators have better ratings than small farmers, the interest and maturity terms will be more 
favorable for large farmers, making the real price of land lower for them than for small farmers. Even special 
government credit programs or machinery import subsidy programs channel capital disproportionately to the large 
farms. 
 
Those who now control larger units of land obviously are able to influence the political processes to a large 
degree. That is greatly disproportionate to their numbers because of the power of their wealth. Thus, land 
redistribution world change this political power structure and could, therefore, lead to considerable conflicts and social 
unrest. The ability of all the small farmers who are given the land to cultivate to its optimum capability in suspect and 
could lead to loss of capital. Since large units are even normally based on large owned units, the chances of 
encouraging large owners to rent their land out in small parcels are extremely limited. In fact, what the Nigerian Land 
Use Decree did was to encourage large owners to displace tenants and operate the land on their own. 
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Land consolidation would be a major innovator for most sections of rural Nigeria, regions where only a few 
communities have amenities such as electricity, pipe-borne water, good roads, or hospitals. Occasionally, their 
nonprovision is premised on the observation the people to be served are ruralities who live or work bits and pieces of 
fields scattered throughout the countryside and that is will be impossible to serve all these scattered locations, In this 
way, it might be possible to combine land consolidation and economic development in the rural areas of Nigeria at the 
same time. 
 
So far, emphasis has been placed on the smallness of farm sizes being a bottleneck in Nigerian agriculture 
and land consolidation, hence, being a logical solution. As concerns small farm sizes, however, it should be noted that 
at least from an analytical viewpoint, a significantly increasing number of people argue in its favor. This includes 
authors such as Berry and Cline (1998), Doner and  Kanel (1997) to mention a few. Most of the authors base their 
argument on empirical studies carried out in developing countries ranging from India to Mexico and Bolivia. The land 
use problem, i.e., land fragmentation, high agricultural population, etc., typical of Nigeria are also present in their 
study areas. Their remarks would, therefore, be applicable to a great extent under the Nigerian situation. 
 
SMALL FARM SIZE HOLDINGS 
 
Although labor must move from agriculture to industry in the process of development, with more than 50% 
of Nigeria’s working labor force engaged in farming and with rapid population growth, the problem becomes that of 
releasing too many laborers from the agricultural sector too soon. It, therefore, follows that whatever agricultural 
development program is carried out needs a labor-intensive and capital-saving approach- at least in the earlier phases 
which could be followed by a capital-intensive, labor-saving approach in the later phases. This according to Johnston 
and Mellor (1961) produces both the required increase in agricultural production without displacing labor prematurely 
form agriculture. The fact that development in manufacturing is capital intensive/labor extensive further complicates 
the issue. 
 
If the obvious assumption of land consolidation is that, in addition to receiving a contiguous holding, each 
person receives a plot of land, which does not fall below a defined economic threshold size, land consolidation will 
result in fewer landholders and landlessness would be a problem. The magnitude of such a problem can be realized in 
view of the inalienable birthright, high social status, and economic power associated with landholding. 
 
With the general scarcity of capital, lack of technical know how, and abundance of relatively cheap labor, 
large farms follow the same pattern of agricultural operations as the small ones. Therefore, it has been argued that 
return to scale in this kind of situation will be approximately constant and, therefore, neutral with respect to the more 
general issue of farm size as related to productivity (Berry and Cline, 1998). Apart from this, decreasing returns to 
scale is actually possible in agricultural production since, on a small farm, the principal workers are the owner, 
himself, and his family and they will have a much more motivated labor force than the larger farms using hired labor. 
 
An argument sometimes in favor of land consolidation is the ability to those farms to employ more labor. 
Apart from the argument earlier put forth as to the decline in labor productivity due to lack of sufficient motivation, 
abundant labor supply may not always be cheap labor. The recent increase in the daily wage in Nigeria from about 
$2.25 to about $6.75 (an increase of 30%) makes the cost of labor now relatively high, while its management on a 
labor-intensive enterprise becomes very difficult due to their lack of skill. In view of this, owners of large farms 
sometimes prefer capital-intensive,  mechanized operations with relatively small force of skilled workers. 
 
With the present set-up in which some few families or individuals hold very large estates for prestige 
purposes or for asset placement rather than for full agricultural production, output on the farms tends to be below its 
maximum potential level because of under-use of land. This is especially true in the prevailing circumstances of high 
inflation, which makes landholding for speculative gain attractive. Agrarian reform, in this case, redistributing large 
estates into new family farms of a moderate size, can combine under-used land with the surplus labor and raise 
agricultural production. This potential increase in production may be sufficient to allow a substantial use on the 
incomes of rural poor even if they have to pay compensation to former landowners in the form of some tariff. In this 
case, the greater employment capacity of small farm units is also demonstrated. 
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Georgescu-Roegan (1990) cautioned that small farm agriculture of peasant proprietors may lead to an access 
of capital equipment on smallholdings. However, the possibility of technological research directed to achieve 
equipment adapted to fit small  farm, as was done in Japan (Doner, 1992), or the reorganization of large farms systems 
on cooperative principles can be designed to assure both labor absorption and efficiency in the use of capital. 
 
Another argument put forth as being the cause of higher utilization of available land resources on small farms 
than on large ones is that of labor market-dualism. The economies of most developing countries are characterized by 
the co-existence of both the “modern” and “traditional” sectors. Whereas, the former is relatively highly capitalized, 
i.e., using labor until its marginal product equals the modern sector wage rate, the latter, with its abundant labor 
supply, has a relatively lower marginal product, possibly below the income received (Booth and  Sundrum (1996). 
This same dualism occurs in agriculture and causes distortion in the sector’s utilization of available land and labor 
resources. 
 
Several factors cause different marginal productivity of labor across farm sizes: 
 
1. Tendency of income sharing on smaller family farms. If the marginal product of labor is low on this farm, 
labor supply price from such a family will be low since this price would be close to the average product of 
labor on the small farm. Since marginal product in the large farm sector will not be below the wage rate, 
which, in turn, equals the wage rate, it follows that the marginal product of labor in the larger farm will be 
greater than on smaller ones. Therefore, the effective price of family labor on the small farm is lower than the 
effective price on large farms. 
2. Where family decision making is possible, the family would hire out labor until its marginal product on the 
family farm rose to equal the wage obtainable outside after allowing for transportation cost to the alternative 
site and any preferences to have or not to have family members working on the farm. These latter factors 
further contribute to a lower marginal product of labor on the family farm compared to the wage rate 
somewhere else. 
3. Where large landowners have monophony power in the labor market, they may hire less and, hence, produce 
less on the same piece of land than would several competitive small farmers. 
 
Therefore, it follows that since the effective price of labor is lower on the small farm, which as a result can 
exploit more marginal land and bring a larger share of its land under cultivation, output per unit of available land 
resources is increased. As such, labor market dualism leads to higher utilization of the available land resource on 
small farms than on large ones. 
 
The ability of the families to consume a greater proportion of their output reduces the risks associated with 
unfavorable prices and encourages increased productivity on smaller farms. Apart from this, if the large landowner 
maintains a monopoly on the product market, there is a great tendency for him to reduce production in order to avoid 
driving down the prices. The small farmers, on the other hand, would not since they would be competitive among each 
other. This invariably reduces the relative productivity of larger farms when measured at fixed prices. 
 
In a developing country like Nigeria, availability of market access roads is limited. This means that for larger 
farms, not all the area would be easily accessible both for cultivation and transportation of primary products, The 
result is reduced productivity on such lands, whereas, such land area would be fully utilized by several farmers as 
most of them would not mind commuting on their bicycles to farms as far as 12 millimeters or even more (Igbozurike, 
1997) from their homes. The possibility of differences in the land quality on the large area and the inability of the 
larger farmer to effectively cultivate all, especially the marginal land is of importance. Here, small farmers, through 
diverse production techniques, could be able to handle all land areas. 
 
With abundant labor supply, the systematic shift towards heavy use of land and capital, as consequential to 
land consolidation and mechanization, imply a general decline in total factor productivity, as the cheap factor of 
production labor is under-utilized. Therefore, if the goal of the economy is maximization of the economy’s total 
output, as well as equitable distribution of income and employment opportunities, small farm holdings better achieve 
these goals given their high labor absorption and the low incomes of most of the persons who live on them. 
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State or cooperative farms, unless correctly organized, may fall below private family farms in productive 
potential (Cline and Berry, 1998). This is mainly due to the general absence of increasing returns to scale as earlier 
mentioned. 
 
SUMMARY 
 
From the above discussion, it is apparent that agrarian structures with unequal land distribution should be expected to 
lead to underutilization of land and, therefore, low land productivity on large farms. It could also be conceded that 
small farm holdings’ system of agricultural reforms has the advantage of provision of more employment, more 
equitable income distribution, a wider and more relevant demand structure for the growing manufacturing sector, a 
better base for farm financed welfare, and more rational investment policies in both the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors of the economy. 
 
On the other hand, proponents of land consolidation argue against small farm holdings on the basis of: 
 
1. the uneconomic farm sizes currently associated with the present traditional land tenure system; 
2. the inability of the small farmers to attract loans and credit both from the government and banks to aid 
agricultural development; 
3. the question of the distance between farms and its effect on productivity; 
4. inability of the urban-industrial sector to employ individuals displaced from agriculture as a result of 
uneconomic farm sizes; 
5. inevitable irregularities and land-grabbing which redistribution and registration of titles might occasion; 
6. the distributional impact- increasing opportunity for some and decreasing it for others- decrease in security 
for virtually all farmers. 
 
POLICY SUGGESTIONS 
 
Peasant Awareness 
 
It is clear that the first step needed is to educate the peasants about the reform objectives, laws and 
procedures. This is necessary for eliciting the support and cooperation of the peasantry. Peasant’s support would help 
resist attempts to foil the reform. It might be useful if local peasant associations are formed and peasants are involved 
in the process of strategy that is more progressive and capable of accommodating the interests promoting participation 
and cooperation among farmers on an independent and the local government who are closer to the peasants. Such a 
weak relationship should be strengthened.  
 
Econometric Models of Land Use 
 
Land use share models have been widely analyzed in the past decade (Lichtenberg, Stavins and Jaffe, Parks 
and Kramer, Wu and Sereston, Plantinga 1996, Hardie and Parks, Miller and Plantinga). Following Miller and 
Plantiga, we aggregate the optimal allocations by individual landowners to derive the observed share of land in county 
i in use k in time t, denoted yk (t,i).  The observed shares are an additive function of the expected share (pk(t,i)) and a 
composite error term related to sampling errors and exogenous shocks affecting land  use allocations (εk(t,i)). The 
expected land use shares are a function of county-level economic decision and land-quality variables (X(t,i)). We 
specify: 
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for k = 1, …, k where βk is a vector of unobserved parameters. The logistic specification restricts the expected shares 
to the unit interval and ensures that they sum to one. As well, the logarithm of the observed shares normalized yk(t,i) 
yields 
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for k = 2,…, k. The model is identified if we normalize the parameters by setting β1=0 and can be estimated by least 
squares provided the number of observations exceeds the number of unknown parameters in βk.. 
 
Estimation Results For Three Nigeria States 
 
We estimate land use share models for Eastern States, Western States, and Northern States. These states 
represent a broad range of current land use patterns, physiographic conditions, and apparent opportunities for 
afforestation. East is heavily forested and, thus, has little agricultural land available for conversion.  We focus on the 
North since much of the land in northern Nigeria is publicly owned and little is in agricultural use. Private forest and 
agricultural land account for between 80% and 93% of the total land area in the three study areas. We assemble county 
data on land areas at different points in time and, normalizing on total land area , form land use shares yk(i,t), where k 
indexes forest (k=1) and agricultural (k=2) uses and i and t index counties and time, respectively. Total land area 
equals the area of all land in the county, except publicly owned forest, and major parklands. We assume that the area 
of land in these uses is exogenous to our model. The use of cross-sectional data is required because we have limited 
time-series information on forest area. A third category (urban/other land) is defined as all land not classified as 
private forest, agricultural land, and publicly owned forest and parks (i.e., y3(i,t) = 1-y1(i,t) – y2(i,t)). This category 
includes developed land in urban, suburban, and rural areas, and other unclassified land. We measure rents from 
forestry (R1(i,t)) as the present discounted value of a stream of real timber revenues per acre. we use population 
density (PD(i,t)) to explain the share of land devoted to urban/other uses. We include measures of the average Land 
Capability Class (LCC) rating (O1(i)) and the percentage of total land in LCC I and II (Q2(i)). In the three models, we 
include a constant term © and intercept shifters (D(t)) for each time period except the last. In the East model, we 
include a variable (TT(i)) measuring the travel time.  For each state, we estimate models with ln(γ2/γ1) and ln (γ3/γ1) 
specified as linear functions of the independent variables. Given that the logistic transformation (1) is used largely due 
to convenience, we conduct Ramsey’s RESET test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 2000) to evaluate the log-linear 
specification (2). In all cases we fail to reject the null hypothesis of linearity at the 5% level.   
 
To a large degree, the empirical results conform to prior expectations (table 3). The estimated coefficients 
can be interpreted as the percentage change in the share ratio (yk /y1) for a one-unit change in the independent variable. 
In the ln(y2 /y1) equations, the coefficients on forest and agricultural rents are negative and positive, respectively and 
all except one are significantly different from zero at the 5% level. All else equal an increase in the forest rent 
decreases the share of agricultural land relative to the forest share. An increase in the agricultural rent has the opposite 
effect. In the ln(y3 /y1) equations, the forest rent coefficients are negative, as expected, but none are significantly 
different from zero. This is a plausible result since forest rents are unlikely to influence the allocation of land to urban 
and other uses. The effect of agricultural rents on the urban/other to forest ratio are ambiguous a priori, and most of 
the estimated coefficients are not significantly different from zero.  
As expected the coefficients on population density are positive in the ln(y3 /y1) equations and all are 
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Population density does not have a significant effect on the ratio of 
agricultural to forest land. Counties with higher average LCC ratings (Q1), corresponding to lower average land 
quality , tend to have less agricultural land relative to forest and (i.e., lower values of (y2 /y1). Conversely, counties 
with larger shares of high-quality agricultural land (Q2) tend to have higher agricultural to forest share ratios, though 
the coefficients on Q2 are not significantly different from zero in the East and North models. The effects of Q1 and Q2 
on ln(y3/y1)  are ambiguous a priori and many of the coefficients are not significantly different from zero. Finally, 
counties in the East with higher transportation costs tend to have less agricultural land relative to forest. 
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Table 3. Estimation Results for Land Use Share Models 
 Eastern States Western States Northern States 
Parameter ln(y2 /y1) ln(y3 /y1) ln(y2 /y1) ln(y3 /y1) ln(y2 /y1) ln(y2 /y1) 
Rents       
R1 0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.0003 -0.02 -0.02 
-1.65 1.43 -6.7 -0.27 -3.5 -1.21 
R2 0.0005 -0.0003 0.001 0.0004 0.001 0.0002 
2.68 -0.257 -5.14 1.35 5.27 1.82 
Other       
PD 2 0.002 -0.027 2.66 0.06 1.89 
0.97 1.81 -0.7 7.05 0.18 5.48 
C 1.37 0.42 -0.98 -1.49 0.29 3.96 
0.96 0.38 -1.19 -1.87 0.27 3.2 
D(71) -0.09 -0.04 
    
-0.42 -0.25 
D(81) 0.2 -0.09 
    
1.3 -0.67 
D(82) 
    
0.15 -0.03 
1.5 -0.29 
D(83) 
  
0.21 0.09 
  
2.1 0.94 
TT -0.2 -0.02 
    
-1.99 -0.21 
Land 
Quality 
      
Q1 -0.74 -0.29 -0.15 -0.01 -0.47 1.09 
-3.67 -1.78 -1.02 -0.05 -2.5 -5.12 
Q2 2.18 1.73 1.25 -1.08 0.54 -1.53 
0.9 0.88 2.72 -1.52 0.77 -1.92 
R2 0.8 0.61 0.55 0.44 0.72 0.72 
0.8 0.61 0.55 0.44 0.72 0.72 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Traditional land tenure system defined the opportunity to earn income in farming and provided the security 
that an individual would always have access to some part of his family’s land. 
 
Past changes in the physical and economic environment had the tenure system changed to allow for 
investment in land and transfer of land to those in a position to use the land more productively the establishment of 
cocoa plantations in the old Western Region of Nigeria posed little problem (Oni, 1997). However, these changes 
have gone far enough to effect overall improved productivity on land. Therefore, investment in land improvement and 
increases on productivity are hindered by tenure rules. 
 
Some have suggested land consolidation as a way out, while others have suggested individualization as a 
solution. However, the cost, as well as the benefits of such policies must be considered before either is chosen as the 
solution. 
 
While the odds appear to be in favor of small holdings as a result of its many benefits, which include increase 
in agricultural investment, increased land mobility and productivity, among others, some likely costs of 
individualization, which include social disorganization, disruption of tribal societies, loss of economic security for 
some large holders, and severe distributional impacts with respect to landholdings and employment, among others, as 
earlier discussed, must be critically looked into. 
 
According to Jacoby (1997), land consolidation programs can be carried out fewer than three distinct 
approaches: 
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1. Consolidation of fragmented holdings without any construction work. 
2. Consolidation of fragmented holdings with small improvements in the road system, but without major 
construction work. 
3. Land consolidation combined with all kinds of construction work that may be connected with the 
reorganization of holdings. 
 
Only type 3 can be considered an agrarian reform measure since it focuses on agricultural development in the 
broadest sense by combing reorganization of holding with land improvement which is a precondition for agricultural 
development. Under this condition, land consolidation, as a land reform policy also appears attractive and 
economically suitable under some prevailing conditions in Nigeria. 
 
Finally, the unknown nature of the ultimate results of tenure changes increases the risks involved in 
introducing any program of land reform. This must be taken into full consideration in initiating any land reform 
program. 
 
Economic justification alone, should not however, be the only basis for determining the particular land 
reform policy to be adopted. The goal of the State had to be defined or understood before any policy can be 
introduced. 
 
Land reform is essentially an attempt by the government through public policies at inducing a change among 
states of the agrarian structure to increase the productivity of land as well as the welfare of the peasantry. The 
divergent socio-political setting in Nigeria in form of the semi feudal estates controlled by the traditional landed elite 
with either bonded labor or rent in labor services amongst the Hausas and the peasant farms ranging from family to 
subfamily (semi-proletarian) where no labor is hired but some may be sold as obtained in the Southern part should be 
taken into consideration. 
 
With this peculiar setting in Nigeria it follows that while the policy of government should be directed 
towards improvement of the welfare of the peasants among the Northern Hausas, the policy for the South should be 
geared towards increased land productivity. 
 
From the earlier discussion one could be tempted to conclude that realizing both the economic and political 
goal of the ruling Government land redistribution would be an ideal policy for the North while consolidation appears 
to be the answer for the Southern part. However, the issue at stake may not be as easily resolvable at that. 
 
Land reforms are not economic needs for the modern sector but merely political gains of working class and 
peasants. Probably this is one of the reasons why the Nigerian Government has not been pressurized into instituting a 
workable land reform program. The fact that there is currently no strong pressure that questions the existing social 
order further makes the land reform issues not being considered an urgent matter. 
Any program introduced in the Northern States, which opposes the semi feudal setting, is bound to face strong 
opposition by the landed elites. This is because these elites have a strong control of the State apparatus in form of 
diversified investments in industry, commerce and finance that give them economic power beyond agriculture. The 
problem bring faces by the Socialist oriented political parties in the North is a glaring example. This therefore means 
that before any meaningful change can take place, there has to be awareness by the peasants of the need for such. 
 
Most of the large farmers in the North are now into modernization especially in view of the many irrigation 
schemes initiated by the Federal Government. Any drastic land redistribution is likely to nullify past productivity at 
least in the short run. With a high degree of urbanization and continuous rural-urban migration, this could lead to 
increasing food shortages resulting in higher prices, which would nullify the good effects of the land redistribution 
program. 
 
With the capitalist form of government in Nigeria, transformation of the agrarian structure is becoming 
increasingly difficult especially in view of its possible international consequences and the increasing powers of the 
bourgeois. With the problems of food shortage and worsening rural poverty, it is not surprise that in an attempt to 
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avoid clashes with the big landowners, some State Governments introduced the integrated rural development 
programs. These are programs designed to create some upper peasant classes without influencing land ownership, as 
technological support becomes substitutes for land redistribution. 
 
Countries may pass laws imposing ceiling and arranging for redistribution of land in excess of these ceilings, 
but those who are likely to lose their land as a result generally find innumerable ways of evading in protracted 
litigation challenging the constitutional validity of the laws., by rearranging their property in the names of nominees, 
by slowing down implementation or when ultimately forced to give up any of their property, by surrendering only the 
least valuable parts. As a result, the record of effective implementation of land redistribution programmed in a 
peaceful manner has been miserable. Most research has to be carried out into the intricate socio-political setting within 
the country before a viable land reform program can be initiated. Ucheda (1999) rightly argued that until the 
government fully understands the operation of the present tenure system and its relation to agricultural viability, it is 
quite risky to alter the basic principles of land tenure. The failure of the 1978 Land Use Decree points towards the 
necessity of such a detailed study. 
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